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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of transaction costs of search on the institution of 
grain brokers in Ethiopia.  Primary data are used to derive traders’ shadow 
opportunity costs of labor and of capital from IV estimation of net profits.  A two-
step Tobit model is used in which traders first choose where to trade and then 
choose whether to use a broker to search on their behalf.  The results confirm 
traders’ individual rationality in choosing brokerage, showing high transaction 
costs are linked to increased broker use while high social capital reduces broker 
use.   1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Transaction costs arise in the course of market exchange and involve the costs 
of information, search, negotiation, screening, monitoring, coordination, and 
enforcement.
1  Transaction costs vary by individual, leading to heterogeneous 
market behavior (Bardhan,1989; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). The specificity 
of transaction costs to individual agents implies that these costs are endogenous 
to the behavior of market participants and are thus unobservable at the market 
level.  Individual efforts to minimize transaction costs lead to the emergence of 
alternative institutional arrangements.  The link between transaction costs and 
the emergence of institutions has long been recognized in institutional economics 
theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; North, 
1990; Williamson, 1985).  However, the inherent difficulty of measuring 
transaction costs at the level of market agents has limited empirical studies of 
whether particular institutions indeed effectively minimize transaction costs.   Yet, 
empirical analysis is particularly warranted in contexts in which agents operate in 
a weak market environment and where transaction costs are presumed to be 
                                                 
1   Transaction costs are defined here as costs related exclusively to the coordination of 
exchange among market actors, distinct from the physical costs of transferring goods, such as 
transport, handling, and storage costs. 
 
   2 
very high, such as the recently liberalized agricultural markets of sub-Saharan 
Africa and other economies in transition. 
 
In spite of the extensive literature on the functioning of agricultural markets in 
less-developed countries,
2 very few studies have addressed the effect of 
transaction costs on market institutions (Bryceson, 1993; Harriss-White, 1996; 
Barrett, 1997).   While this omission is due in part to the lack of adequate data on 
transaction costs, it is also rooted in the assumption that prices are linearly 
related, supporting the neoclassical hypothesis that there are no agent-specific 
transaction costs and that transfer costs are fixed across time and across 
agents.
3    
 
In the context of the Ethiopian grain market, this paper addresses the transaction 
costs related to searching for a buyer or a seller, a central aspect of the 
exchange process.  Search is costly, both in terms of labor costs for search 
activities and the time cost of holding inventory during the search period.  The 
paper has two objectives.  First, the paper aims to overcome the endogeneity 
bias of quantitatively measuring transaction costs by imputing the shadow 
opportunity costs of search labor and of capital held during search from individual 
                                                 
2  See Jones, 1996 for a review of this literature. 
 
3  This assumption has been shown to result in significant upward bias in the measurement of 
market integration (Baulch 1994).  Further, it is recognized that interpretation of results of price-
based models is problematic without additional information on institutional marketing 
arrangements (Palaskas and Harriss-White, 1993; Dercon, 1995).   3 
traders’ profit functions, using a rich set of instruments for access to labor and 
capital.   Second, the paper focuses on a particular market institution in the 
Ethiopian market, grain brokers, and tests empirically the hypothesis that market 
agents are individually rational in using the services of brokers to minimize their 
transaction costs of search.   The study of the brokerage institution in Ethiopia is 
particularly interesting because grain wholesalers are not obligated to use 
brokers for any or all of their transactions, thus enabling an empirical test of the 
determinants of their choice to use brokers.  Thus, while 85% of the sampled 
traders in Ethiopia indicated using brokers regularly, they used brokers for 30% 
of their total transactions, on average, suggesting that they chose whether or not 
to use brokers on a per transaction basis.   At the market level, in a context 
where market participants can choose whether or not to use brokers, rational use 
of brokers by individual agents implies that this institution enhances global 
market efficiency by promoting a more efficient allocation of search effort. 
 
Generally, brokers play an important role in most markets in which buyers and 
sellers are unknown to each other, whether these markets are highly 
sophisticated, organized exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade 
(Cronon, 1991), or periodic markets with extremely limited infrastructure, such as 
agricultural markets throughout the developing world (Gilbert, 1969; Lele, 1971; 
Jones, 1972; Scott, 1985; Hayami and Kawagoe, 1993).   Brokers have rarely 
been studied despite their critical function in the exchange of goods.   Where the   4 
role of intermediaries has been analyzed, in the financial and real estate 
literatures, the link between transaction costs and the emergence of 
intermediaries as a mechanism to reduce costs is not drawn (Townsend, 1978; 
Rubenstein and Wolinsky, 1987, Yavas, 1994, Aitken et al, 1995; Cosimano, 
1996). 
 
The Ethiopian grain market, like many agricultural markets in the developing 
world, operates in a constrained environment lacking a system of public 
information transmission, grain standardization and certification services, efficient 
and accessible telecommunications and transport, and effective legal 
mechanisms to enforce contracts (Gebre-Meskel, 1996; Negassa, 1998).  A 
particular feature of the Ethiopian grain market is that the pattern of grain trade 
follows a radial structure with grain flowing into a single central market from 
outlying surplus production areas and flowing out from the central market to 
deficit areas in other regions of the country (Lirenso, 1996).  This radial structure 
implies that the majority of grain traded in the country is exchanged in the central 
market, crosses relatively long distances, and is traded between agents who 
otherwise have no contact.    
 
In Ethiopia, brokers play a pivotal role in the transfer of grains from surplus 
regions to deficit regions.  There are approximately 40 established grain brokers 
located in Addis Ababa, the central market, relative to a total of 2,500 grain   5 
wholesalers (Lirenso, 1993; Amha, 1994).  Brokers do not trade on their own 
account and fulfill a purely intermediary role of matching buyers and sellers, 
located in distant regional markets.  In return, brokers receive a commission that 
is a fixed fee per quantity traded.
4   
 
                                                 
4  The agency relations and incentive mechanisms of brokers in this market is presented in 
Gabre-Madhin (1998).   6 
2.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
This study uses primary data collected in Ethiopia in 1996 on 152 wholesale 
grain traders and 17 grain brokers in 12 markets in seven regions.  The study 
regions were selected on the basis of their representation by type of grain, 
geographical distribution and importance to national grain flows.  The study 
regions comprised three surplus regions, Wollega region (Nekempte and Jaji 
markets), Arsi region (Assela and Sagure markets), and Gojjam region (Bahr Dar 
and Bure markets) and three deficit regions, Wollo (Dessie and Kombolcha 
markets), Tigray (Mekele market), and Hararghe (Dire Dawa and Harar), in 
addition to the central market of Addis Ababa.   Trader and broker surveys were 
carried out in two rounds in 1996.  In each market, the maximum number of 
traders were sampled, from a random selection of existing traders in the market.  
Given the unavailability of a reliable census of traders from official sources, this 
method was considered to be the least-biased alternative.   
 
With respect to search labor, information was collected on the minutes spent 
daily gathering market information, traders consulted daily, person-days required 
to conduct a transaction, offers considered prior to completing a transaction, 
employees engaged in search, and traders’ access to additional labor, such as   7 
the number of family members available and the traders’ other occupations.  With 
respect to the cost of capital, information was collected on the amount of working 
capital held by traders, the frequency of turnover of capital, and the sources and 
amount of credit obtained (bank, friends, family, supplier, savings association).  
Additional information on traders’ access to additional capital was collected on 
the number of possible creditors, parents in grain business, ownership of 
collateral assets, and inheritance.   Data on social capital, or the extent of 
“connectedness” that traders had, were obtained through questions regarding the 
number of local and distant market contacts, the number of contacts from the 
same region, the number of family and friends in grain trade, the number of 
regular partners traders had in local and distant markets, and the number of 
languages spoken.   Finally, traders were asked to detail what proportion of local 
and distant transactions occurred with intermediaries, for purchases and sales 
separately.   
   8 
3.  ESTIMATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS OF MARKET SEARCH 
 
Each trader faces a unique set of transaction costs related to his or her costs of 
finding a buyer or seller with whom to exchange.  The trader invests labor time in 
the search process and, because search is time-consuming, bears the 
opportunity cost of the labor time spent in search.  Second, the trader bears the 
opportunity cost of tying up his or her working capital in the form of grain stocks 
while the search is under way.  
 
Using directly observed search labor and working capital to explain traders’ use 
of brokerage would result in endogeneity bias since the actual levels of search 
labor and working capital chosen by traders are not independent of their choice 
of brokerage.   In order to avoid this bias, the opportunity costs of the traders’ 
search time and working capital are derived as shadow costs from each trader’s 
profit function.  After controlling for physical marketing costs, such as transport, 
handling, and storage, each trader maximizes revenue subject to his or her costs 
of the labor time invested in search and the opportunity cost of holding grain 
inventory during the search period.   Each trader is endowed with a unique 
distribution of trading contacts that directly influences his or her ability to find a 
trading partner.  This distribution, or network, is considered a parameter of the   9 
trader’s social capital and acts as a positive shifter in the trader’s revenue 
function.  The trader’s revenue maximization is expressed by 
 
(1)  ￿   =   g L
a K
b e
e   - wL -  nK  
 
where  g  is social capital, w is the opportunity cost of search labor (L), and n is 
the opportunity cost of working capital (K).  From the first-order conditions for 
profit maximization, the shadow opportunity costs of search labor w
* and of 
working capital n
* are derived as   










Ordinary least squares estimation of the trader’s revenue function would result in 
asymptotically biased estimators because of the simultaneity bias that exists 
because both search labor and working capital depend on revenue and thus will 
not be independent of the model’s error term.
5   To overcome this bias, two-stage 
least squares estimation is used to obtain the coefficients necessary for deriving 
w* and n*.   A rich set of instruments for search labor and working capital are 
                                                 
5  This issue generally plagues the estimation of production functions, to which a solution is to 
apply duality theory, a solution which fails to use all available information and is statistically 
inefficient (Mundlak, 1996).  In this case, the existence of a rich set of instruments provides a 
more convincing instrumental variables estimator. 
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obtained from the data, chosen on the basis of their impact on search labor and 
working capital without directly influencing revenue. Instruments used for search 
labor are access to additional persons to help in search, the number of 
languages spoken by the trader, the trader’s age, and whether the trader has 
another business.  Instruments for working capital are access to a bank loan, 
access to credit from friends and family, collateral assets such as a home or a 
car, inheritance of family business, and other family members in business. 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the instrumental variable estimation of trader 
revenue, used to derive the opportunity costs of labor and capital for individual 
traders.  The estimation uses two alternative specifications of trader revenue.  
Net revenue, the net margin (after accounting for physical marketing costs) 
multiplied by the quantity of sales is used in the first estimation.  The gross value 
of sales is used in the second estimation.  Search labor is measured by the 
number of persons in the trading firm who are engaged in search for buyers and 
sellers.  Working capital is measured by the average amount of funds that the 
trader has at his or her disposal for the purpose of buying and transacting grain.  
Social capital is measured by the number of persons in the grain trade business 
whom the trader knows personally. Search labor, working capital, and social 
capital have positive coefficients, as expected, and are significant in both model 
estimations.  The Wald test of the assumption of homogeneity reveals that the 
null hypothesis that revenue is homogenous of degree 1 in search labor and   11 
working capital holds at the 13% confidence level.
6  The a and b coefficients 
generated from the two-stage least squares estimation are used to derive the 
shadow opportunity cost of labor (w*) and the shadow opportunity cost of capital 
(n*) for each individual trader.  
 
The distribution of the estimated opportunity costs of search labor (w*) and of 
working capital (n*) across traders are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  The 
opportunity costs of search labor are relatively low for the majority of the sample 
(Figure 1).  Thus, nearly 60% of traders have shadow opportunity labor costs 
less than 40 Ethiopian Birr daily (equivalent to US$ 6.00 in 1996).  Although this 
shadow wage is significantly higher than the national income per capita per day,
7 
this result suggests that traders are not time-constrained relative to existing 
market opportunities.  Conversely, there are limited opportunities for the majority 
of traders to increase revenue through alternative uses of their labor time.  In 
contrast, the opportunity cost of capital is normally distributed across the sample 
population (Figure 2), with an average annual interest rate of 15%, which is 
significantly higher than the official bank interest rate of 10% in 1996 (National 
Bank of Ethiopia).   The higher variability of shadow costs of capital suggests that 
capital constraints may be more binding in terms of traders’ market behavior, with 
                                                 
6  Tests for functional form specification were carried with alternative specifications, such as 
translog and CES, were carried out. 
7  The average annual per capita income in Ethiopia was $110.00, or Birr 700.00, in 1996 (World 
Bank). 
   12 
a greater number of traders likely to opt for opportunities to reduce these costs.  
In sum, the distribution of both types of transaction costs across traders 
demonstrates the heterogeneity of individual market actors and allow the testing 
of the impact of these costs on the use of the brokerage institution in the 
Ethiopian grain market, addressed below.   
   13 
4.  TRADERS’ SEQUENTIAL CHOICE AND USE OF BROKERS 
 
In constrained market environments, long-distance trade involves high 
coordination costs and considerable risk.   Each trader is faced with the choice of 
incurring higher search costs by trading in a distant market or trading locally, in a 
familiar market, where search costs are relatively low but opportunities are 
limited.   In Ethiopia, grain wholesalers in regional market centers, located 300 to 
500 kilometers from the central market, can either transact locally in their own 
market towns or trade in the distant central market.  This choice is partly 
determined by the type of region in which traders are based.  Wholesalers 
located in surplus production regions tend to purchase grain locally from smaller 
traders and farmers and sell this grain in the distant central market.   Wholesalers 
located in the deficit regions tend to procure grain from the central market and to 
sell it locally to retailers and consumers (Table 2).  Because long-distance 
transactions entail higher search costs and are enhanced by larger endowments 
of social capital, the choice to trade in a distant market is endogenous to each 
trader’s unique search costs and social capital.  A trader’s share of long-distance 
transactions depends on his or her opportunity costs of search labor and of 
working capital, social capital, as well as market-level effects, such as the 
trader’s location. The average share of long-distance purchases (P-i) and sales   14 
(S-i) of other traders in the same market capture these effects.  Thus, the trader’s 
share of long-distance trade in total transactions is represented as 
 
(4)       Di,t =  a0 +  a1 w* +  a2   n*+  a3 g +  a4  P-i +  a5 S-i+ u1 
 
Di,t  =  0   otherwise     
 
Traders who have chosen to trade long-distance in the central market are faced 
with a second choice, in the presence of brokers.  Each trader evaluates the 
expected gains from searching directly without a broker with the expected gains 
from using a broker.  A trader’s net profit from searching directly is a function of 
his or her individual transaction costs of search, social capital, and the time he or 
she requires to find a buyer or seller in the distant market (t).  A general form for 
a trader’s net profit function from direct search is Pi
d = P(gi,wi,ni,ti).   When a 
trader uses a broker, his or her net profit no longer depends on the trader’s 
opportunity cost of search labor, social capital, or time that he or she requires to 
find a buyer or seller.  Instead, the trader’s net profit from using a broker is a 
function of the broker’s social capital (g
b), the broker’s commission (k), the 
trader’s opportunity cost of tying up his or her working capital, and the time 
required for the broker, rather than the trader, to complete the search (t
b).  A 
general form for a trader’s net profit from using a broker is Pi
b = P(g
b, k,ni, t
b).    15 
A trader’s participation constraint for using a broker is that net gains are higher 
with a broker than with direct search, such that Pi
b ³ Pi
d.  If the broker is more 
efficient in search than the trader, g
b> gi and t
b <ti.  In this case, the difference 
between profits from using a broker and from searching directly, Pi
b - Pi
d, 
increases in the trader’s opportunity cost of search labor and of working capital 
and decreases in social capital.   Because search costs are higher for long-
distance transactions, a trader’s use of brokerage increases with the share of 
long-distance trade (Table 2).   Thus, the trader’s share of brokered trade in total 
transactions (B) depends on his or own transaction costs of search, social 
capital, regional effects (G), as well as the predicted share of long-distance trade 
( $
, Dit) :   
(5)       Bi,t =    b0 +  b1 w*  +  b2  n*  +  b3 g  +  b4  å $
, Dit +  b5  å G +  u2 
Bi,t  =  0   otherwise   
A recursive approach is used to represent participation in brokerage as a function 
of participation in long-distance trade, which itself is influenced by social capital 
and the transaction costs of search and social capital.  Recursive econometric 
models have been used to explain gift exchange (Ravallion and Dearden, 1988) 
and technology adoption (Kumar, 1994, Zeller et al, 1996).  A two-step Tobit 
estimation avoids the inconsistent estimates of brokerage use due to the 
simultaneity bias that arises because trader-specific variables will influence both   16 
the use of brokers and the share of long-distance trade.
8   In the first step, 
predicted shares of long-distance trade (D) are obtained from the Tobit 
estimation of Equation 4.   In the second step, predicted shares of long-distance 
trade ( $ D) are used to estimates the shares of brokerage use (B).
9   The use of 
censored regression, rather than least squares, is justified by the existence of a 
significant proportion of traders with zero shares of long-distance trade and of 
brokerage. Ordinary least squares would result in upward biased estimators due 
to the selectivity bias that results from only including non-zero observations in the 
analysis (Greene).  The expected marginal effects of the opportunity costs of 
search and capital and of long-distance trade on the use of brokers are positive, 




















                                                 
8  A similar specification is used by Ravallion and Dearden (1988) to model transfer receipts and 
outlays, in which predicted consumption is used as a proxy for the regressand, post-transfer 
permanent income.  
 
9   Using predicted, rather than actual, shares from the first Tobit estimation results in inconsistent 
standard errors.  This can be corrected with a maximum likelihood estimation. 
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5.  ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR TRADERS’ LONG-DISTANCE TRADE 
(STEP 1) 
 
Tobit estimations of the share of each trader’s long-distance trade are based on 
the shadow transaction costs obtained from both the net revenue and the gross 
value of sales IV estimations in Table 1.  Shares of long-distance trade are 
estimated for purchases and sales separately, in order to control for the location 
effect on long-distance trading behavior, noted earlier.  Unconditional or Tobit 
elasticities adjust the estimated coefficients by accounting for both the effect on 
the conditional mean of the dependent variable in the positive part of the 
distribution and the effect on the probability that the observation will fall in the 
positive part of the distribution (McDonald and Moffitt).
10  Tobit elasticities are 
obtained by adjusting the coefficients by the F proportion of the sample that has 
zero observations of the dependent variable.  In effect, this adjustment lowers the 
marginal effect by the probability that traders with zero distant transactions would 
engage in some amount of distant transactions as a result of marginal changes in 
the regressors.  In both model specifications, transaction costs have a large and 
                                                 
10  McDonald and Moffitt (1980) suggest a decomposition of the slope vector into: ¶E[yi|xi] /¶xi  = 
Prob[yi* >0] ¶E[yi*|xi, yi*>0]/¶xi  + E[yi*|xi, yi*>0] ¶Prob[yi* >0]/ ¶xi.   The unconditional elasticity is 
obtained by scaling the parameters of the Tobit regression by the probability in the uncensored 
part of the distribution.   See also Greene (1993) for examples and Ravallion and Dearden (1988) 
for an application of this method. 
 
   18 
significant effect on long-distance trade for purchases and sales (Table 3). 
Similarly, social capital also has a significant, though smaller, impact on distant 
trade, with the exception of distant purchases in the second set of estimations. In 
contrast, market-level effects are relatively small and highly significant in the 
case of the same type of transaction, either purchase or sale.  It is difficult to 
interpret the signs of the transaction cost and social capital coefficients, which 
appear inverted, because of the endogeneity between transaction costs, long-
distance trade, and use of brokers.  
   19 
7.  ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR TRADERS’ USE OF BROKERS (STEP 2) 
 
In the second step, the share of brokered transactions is estimated with Tobit for 
both model specifications and for purchases and sales separately (Table 4).   In 
order to control for the effects of local use of brokers (that is, within regional 
market centers), the share of brokered transactions is restricted to brokers used 
for long-distance trade.  The set of explanatory variables used includes regional 
dummy variables to capture the effects of regional effects.  In a simultaneous 
system of Tobit equations, where predicted values of long-distance trade are 
used as a regressor, standard errors of the estimated coefficients will be 
inconsistent.  To correct for this, standard errors are estimated through 
bootstrapping with 1,000 replications, a procedure that provides generally very 
good estimates.
11   
 
Traders’ use of brokers is individually rational in that higher transaction costs 
lead to increased use of brokers while higher social capital reduces the use of 
brokers, suggesting that the presence of brokers enables traders to minimize 
                                                 
11  This procedure involves random drawing, with replacement, N observations from the dataset, 
and estimating the statistics for each replication. From the dataset of estimated statistics, one can 
estimate the standard error of the statistic.  However, the point estimate used in the orginal 
observed statistic qobs rather than the average `q* from the replications (Mooney and Duval, 
1993).   20 
their transaction costs and trade more efficiently.
12  In both model specifications, 
results are more robust for distant purchases than for sales.  This may be 
explained by the fact that purchasing involves more transaction costs than sales 
in that buyers must ensure that the quality and the quantity of the contracted 
grain will conform to their expectations and that delivery will occur, in the 
appropriate time.  In the net revenue specification (Model 1), the opportunity cost 
of labor spent in search has a larger effect than the opportunity cost of capital or 
social capital on the use of brokers. The high likelihood of receiving inferior grain 
or being quoted an incorrect price leads many traders to go directly to the central 
market to conduct purchases.  Traveling to the central market, located between 
up to 700 kilometers away, requires leaving a responsible manager at the 
trader’s stall.   Traders who are unable to do this and who are active traders thus 
have a very high opportunity cost of labor and are likely to use brokers for distant 
purchases.  Transaction costs seem to matter less in the case of sales, perhaps 
because traders are not concerned with being cheated on the quality of the grain. 
Typically, traders who ship grain to the central market must wait until the sale is 
completed and they have received their payments before purchasing new stocks 
of grain.  Highly impatient traders, who seek to turn their capital around as 
quickly as possible, are thus more likely to engage the services of a broker and 
minimize on the time that their working capital is tied up in grain stocks.  In the 
                                                 
12   A welfare simulation of the economic efficiency gains from brokerage is addressed in Gabre-
Madhin (1998).   21 
second model specification, the opportunity cost of capital has a larger effect on 
traders’ use of brokers, although the magnitudes of the effect of both costs and of 
social capital are lower than in the first model.   
 
Somewhat surprisingly, predicted shares of long-distance trade do not appear to 
have a significant impact on the use of brokers and their effects are relatively 
minor relative to other explanatory variables even where significant, in the case 
of purchases in the second model.    Finally, the region in which traders are 
located appears to have a very large and significant effect on the use of brokers, 
particularly in the case of Wollega, Arsi, and Gojjam, the three surplus producer 
regions. 
   22 
8.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Despite the recent focus on the importance of markets for economic growth, very 
little is known about how transaction costs influence the emergence of market 
institutions.   Even less is known about the nature and extent of these transaction 
costs, which are generally assumed to be fixed across market participants.   
Contrary to standard assumptions, individually varying transaction costs imply 
that economic agents are not interchangeable in terms of their behavior in the 
market.  An important gap in understanding how markets work is the process and 
costs incurred by each market participant in searching for a trading partner and 
the role played by intermediaries in facilitating market search.  This study 
addressed this gap by measuring the extent of trader-specific transaction costs of 
search and by investigating the impact of these costs on traders’ use of the 
institution of brokerage.     
 
The study revealed that the costs associated with searching for a trading partner 
vary significantly across traders, according to where traders operate, the type of 
transaction they are conducting, and their individual characteristics.  A unique 
data set on Ethiopian grain traders’ individual search efforts, access to capital,  23 
trading networks, along with a rich set of instruments, enabled the analysis of the 
effects of these costs on trading arrangements made by individual traders. 
 
An empirical model linking individual traders’ transaction costs and use of 
brokers was constructed to test whether traders were individually rational in 
choosing to use brokers in order to minimize their transaction costs of search.  In 
testing this model, sample selectivity bias was avoided through the inclusion of 
non-users of brokerage and simultaneity bias, due to the fact that the location of 
trade is linked to the choice of brokerage, was avoided by using predicted shares 
of distant transactions from a regression of distant shares against traders’ 
transaction costs, social capital, and market-level effects.   
 
The results reveal that, despite traders’ heterogeneity, their individual behavior 
vis-à-vis the presence of brokers is economically efficient.  This finding suggests 
that traders operating in newly liberalized markets are “efficient-but-poor,” to 
paraphrase Schultz’ classic hypothesis, in that they operate within highly 
constrained, risky, and costly marketing environments.  Thus, while traders 
exhibit optimizing behavior, they are nonetheless clearly acting in a second-best 
world.  The results imply that the function of brokers is critical in reducing 
transaction costs and enhancing the performance of the Ethiopian grain market.  
In addressing the key question of how best to strengthen the performance of the 
private sector in the post-market reform era, this study supports the view that   24 
policy must have a clear understanding of the transaction costs faced by traders 
and their impact on the microeconomic behavior of traders.   This study highlights 
that efforts to improve the overall efficiency of the Ethiopian grain market must be 
aimed at increasing the efficiency of the search function provided by brokers and 
at formalizing and strengthening their specialized role in the market, which will 
particularly benefit those traders with the highest transaction costs of search.   
   25 















Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Intercept _CONS  1.87 
 
3.82   1.99  3.38   
Search labor 
 










0.34 0.13  ***  0.23 0.11  ** 
Adj. R
2   0.28    0.22   
N   174      178   
Wald test (r) 






      




















   Instruments: 
   OTHRESP 
 





   NLANG  Number of languages spoken by trader  1.89  0.80 
   OTHBUS  =1 if trader has another business  0.22  0.41 










  Instruments: 
   POSSBANK 
 





      ACCESS  Number of persons trader could ask for 
loan 
4.10 3.20 
   HOME  =1 if trader owns residence  0.57  0.49 
   CAR  =1 if trader owns car  0.08  0.27 
   INHERIT  =1 if trader inherited business  0.26  0.44 










* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%   26 




   Share of Distant 
Purchases 




(% of Total 
Sales) 
Share of Distant 
Brokered 
Purchases 
(% of Total Distant 
Purchases) 
Share of Distant 
Brokered Sales 
(% of Total 
Distant Sales) 
          
Surplus  Mean  52.06 65.49 27.49  66.18 
   Std. Dev.  36.53 34.50 36.63  37.69 
   N  116 114  97  103 
         
Deficit  Mean  64.73 8.25  48.45  37.22 
   Std. Dev.   41.02 15.71 44.53  47.68 
   N  97 97 80  27 
         
Central  Mean  18.57 8.58 0.00  0.00 
   Std. Dev.  35.14 22.44  0.00  0.00 
   N  67 67 21  11 
         
Total  Mean  48.44 31.80 33.04  55.47 
   Std. Dev.  41.63 38.51 40.95  42.98 
   N  280 278 198  141 
a The statistics are compiled for two rounds of shares data. 
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Table 3.  Tobit Estimation of the Shares of Long - Distance Trade 
  
       
  (1) 
Net Revenue 
(2) 
Value of Sales 
   Distant 
Purchases 
Distant Sales  Distant Purchases  Distant Sales 
   (% share)  (% share)  (% share)  (% share) 
Variable   Coef. 
S.E. 






































    92.32     86.00      78.90     73.66    
                        
Market Share  Pj¹i   0.72 ***  0.18  -0.45 **  -0.18  1.50 ***  0.37  -0.36 **  0.15 
Distant Purch.    0.11     0.21     0.20     0.18    
                       
Market Share  Sj¹i   -0.22   -0.06  0.78 ***  0.32  -0.24   -0.06  1.93 ***  0.79 
Distant  Sales    0.16     0.08      0.17     0.17    
                       
Opp.Cost   ln w*  53.43 ***  13.36  75.02 ***  30.76  15.88 ***  4.00  26.13 ***  10.71 
of Labor    19.60     18.04     5.76     5.32    
                       
Opp. Cost   ln n*  48.99 **  12.25  58.34   23.92  45.68 **  11.42  54.03 ***  22.15 
of Capital    22.01     20.13 ***    20.71     18.94    
                       
Social Capital  ln`Z  -23.91 *  6.00  -41.73 ***  17.11  -3.40   -0.85  -15.02 **  6.16 
    14.69     13.58   7.61   7.06    
                 
Number of 
observations 
200     200   200   200  
SEE                46.14   
Prob (T>0|`X)                  
Predicted  0.33   0.52    0.31   0.40   
  Actual 0.25   0.41    0.25   0.41   
* Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%   28 
 
Table 4.   Tobit Estimation of the Shares of Broker Use for Distant Trade 
  
       
  (1) 
Net Revenue 
(2) 
Value of Sales 
   Distant Purchases  Distant Sales  Distant Purchases  Distant Sales 
   (% share)  (% share)  (% share)  (% share) 










































    713.91     616.57     621.30      531.17     
                        
Predicted   Dpurch   0.70   0.22  -0.36    0.21  0.71 *  0.23  -0.36   0.20 
Distant  Purch.    0.53     0.60     0.56      0.55     
                         
Predicted Dsale  -5.84   -1.87  -1.37    -0.77  -5.87  ** -1.90  -1.37    -0.76 
Distant  Sales    1.80     1.20     1.90      1.09     
                         
Opp.Cost   ln w*  384.05 ***  122.90  205.83 *  115.26  132.67 ***  42.45  61.43 *  34.40 
of Labor    148.76     120.38     51.97     38.14    
                       
Opp. Cost   ln n*  301.65 ***  96.53  188.06 *  105.31  279.46 ***  89.43  175.31 *  98.17 
of Capital    127.31     107.40     124.64     100.09    
                       
Social Capital  ln`Z  -231.82 ***  -74.18  -137.73 **  -77.13  -94.50 ***  -30.24  -58.85 **  -32.96 
    85.91     74.44     35.34      30.87     
                       
WOLLEGA    438.53  ***  140.33 265.73  ***  148.81 484.60  *** 155.07  351.68  *** 196.94 
    151.80     104.34     135.14      120.72    
                        
ARSI    676.64  ***  216.52 256.55  ** 143.67 715.25  *** 228.88  366.89  *** 205.46 
    224.41     113.47     191.95      143.74    
                        
TIGRAY    108.79 ***  34.81  258.79 ***  144.92  104.74  ***  33.52  264.23 **  147.97 
    38.58     66.65     37.59      67.14     
                        
    136.25     82.36     136.08      111.70    
                        
HARARGHE    -71.62  *** -22.92  66.37    31.01  -64.59  ** -20.67  65.97    36.94 
    39.44     52.59     38.55    51.93   
                 
N  151     116   151    116   
SEE    85.75    80.59   94.81    80.80   
Prob (T>0|`X)                
Predicted  0.26   0.52   0.35    0.54   
  Actual  0.32   0.56   0.32    0.56   
a  Standard errors are estimated from bootstrapping with 1000 replications. * 
Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5%; *** Significance at 1%   29 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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